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ABSTRACT 
As China rises and becomes a global power, its foreign and economic policies are 
undergoing profound changes. Today Chinese interest spans the world, from the most 
remote corners of Africa to the mega cities of other new rising powers like Brazil. 
China’s growing presence in Portuguese-speaking countries provides a vivid illustration 
of the growing complexity and sophistication of China’s new foreign and economic 
policies. Sino-Lusophone relations confirm some of the assumptions made about 
Beijing’s relations with the developing world. However, this case study also reveals 
many incorrect assumptions and simplistic analyses of China’s foreign and economic 
policies toward the developing world. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is the culmination of eight years of work on China’s relations with 
Portuguese-speaking countries. Through this period, the author produced more than thirty 
articles, ranging from op-eds to policy reports to articles for academic journals. This 
thesis synthesizes many of these published and unpublished works in an attempt to 
produce the first comprehensive study of Sino-Lusophone relations in the context of the 
People’s Republic of China’s growing relationship with the developing world. The aim of 
this work is to analyze the relationship between China and the Lusophone world1 through 
a comparative and analytical study of China’s diplomatic and economic strategy in the 
developing world. 
A significant amount of attention has been given to China’s relationships with 
major regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the European Union (EU). 
However, China’s expanding ties with the Portuguese-speaking world has gone relatively 
unnoticed. Eight countries—Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, 
Portugal, Sao Tome, and Timor-Leste—comprise the Comunidade dos Países de Língua 
Portuguesa (CPLP), or Community of Portuguese Language Countries. At first glance, 
one may be forgiven for wondering why China has devoted so much attention to the 
CPLP. However, closer analysis reveals that the Portuguese-speaking world is becoming 
an important dimension of China’s foreign policy.2 
The diversity of the six Portuguese-speaking nations analyzed in this study makes 
for a good and wide-ranging case study for testing Beijing’s foreign policy. Focusing on 
                                                 
1 There are eight Portuguese-speaking countries: Angola, Brazil, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, 
Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe and Timor-Leste. This study excludes Portugal due to the fact that it is 
not a developing nation and Sao Tome due to the fact that it has no diplomatic ties with the People’s 
Republic of China. The country has established ties with Taiwan. 
2 There is very little literature on the topic of China’s relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries. 
The very first article examining this topic was published in 2006 by the author, “China’s Portuguese 
Connection,” Yale Global Magazine, June 22, 2006. However, there are a growing number of sources 
dealing with China’s relations with individual countries, particularly Brazil and Angola. Ana Cristina 
Alves, “Chinese Economic Diplomacy in Africa: The Lusophone Strategy,” in China Returns to Africa: A 
Rising Power and a Continents Embrace, ed. Chris Alden et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008), 69–81.  
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the six Lusohpone nations—Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, 
and Timor-Leste—provides an extreme richness in variety for a case study. The variety is 
present in all dimensions. First, the six nations are spread through three continents: 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Secondly, they are diverse in their stages of 
development. Brazil is becoming increasingly industrialized, while Guinea Bissau is 
among the tenth poorest countries in the world. Brazil stands as the giant of the group, 
with an area as large as the United States, a population of 190 million, and a fast-rising 
economy. Brazil can, in turn, be contrasted with tiny Cape Verde, with an area of just 
4,067 square kilometers and 500,000 inhabitants. For these and other reasons, which will 
be elaborated in greater detail, the case study of the Portuguese-speaking world offers the 
prospect of understanding China’s foreign policy towards a geographically and culturally 
distinct group of nations. 
This thesis is an exhaustive and in-depth study of China’s relations with the eight 
Portuguese-speaking countries. The six nations in question are used as case studies to 
address the following working question that is the core objective of my Masters’ 
research: How successful has China’s foreign policy been in advancing Chinese interests 
in the Lusophone world? This research topic is significant and relevant for the following 
reasons: no research has ever been conducted on Sino-Lusophone relations before, either 
in the Portuguese-speaking world or in Anglo-Saxon academia. Therefore, the current 
proposal has the potential to become a pioneering work that will hopefully generate 
further interest in the topic. Considering that one of the main objectives of a thesis is to 
break new ground and generate new ideas, the poorly researched nature of the topic 
makes it, in itself, an important issue to address and a contribution to both the study of 
China and the Lusophone countries’ foreign policies. 
The relevance of the study of Sino-Lusophone relations goes well beyond the 
Portuguese-speaking world, and offers the possibility to understand various other 
countries and regions. For instance, a study of China’s relations with the five African 
Portuguese-speaking countries will contribute to a better understanding of China’s 
growing presence in the continent. The five African Portuguese-speaking countries are 
important to China in ways that may have significant implications for China’s future 
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economic development, particularly its energy needs. Without question, Angola is 
China’s most important partner on the African continent. Its importance lies in the fact 
that it is the second-largest oil producer in Africa, is home to one of the world’s largest 
diamond fields and other precious stones, such as rubies and emeralds.  
China’s relations with the Portuguese-speaking African nations are also an 
interesting case study of the complexities and sophistication of China’s growing ties with 
the continent. Contrary to prevalent Western perceptions, China’s relation with Africa 
encompasses much more than a desire to scavenge for oil and gas. Although energy 
resources are a prime motivator, they are not the sole driving factor. For instance, while 
China has invested considerably in securing a prominent position in oil-rich Angola and 
in Sudan, its presence has also grown in other less-endowed territories. Chinese 
involvement with the resource-poor Cape Verde islands is a case in point. Cape Verde 
has literally no natural resources and the islands suffer from severe draught, which makes 
agriculture difficult. 
The initial task of this research was to identify and analyze China’s interests in the 
Lusophone countries. Research identified five main motivators and objectives behind the 
PRC’S strategy towards the Lusophone countries. First, energy resources—oil and gas in 
particular—are one the strongest driving factors behind China’s strategy towards the 
block. Other energy products and raw materials have increased Beijing’s desire to engage 
the Portuguese-speaking countries and consolidate its influence. Brazil possesses one of 
the world’s largest uranium reserves, in addition to large quantities of gold, bronze, 
nickel, iron, manganese, and mercury, not to mention its possession of the world’s largest 
forests. Angola, in addition to oil and gas, is the fourth largest producer of diamonds and 
has vast quantities of marble, emeralds, sapphire, and rubies. Mozambique, Guinea 
Bissau, and Timor-Leste are equally endowed with rich natural resources. 
The second motivator behind Chinese interest is the search for markets for 
China’s rising economic output. China sees the Portuguese-speaking countries, with its 
230 million inhabitants, as a possible lucrative outlet for its exports. Chinese 
investments—both state-owned and private—are also an important motivator. The rise of 
China has created an increasingly wealthy and prosperous business class that is 
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desperately looking for new markets. Chinese companies have invested heavily in 
infrastructure projects, agriculture, services, industrial parks, and other major areas 
throughout the Portuguese-speaking world. As of 2007, Brazil was China’s main trading 
partner in Latin America with two-way trade totaling $20 billion, while Angola is its 
main partner in Africa with two-way trade reaching $10 billion in the same period. It is 
significant that trade between China and Brazil has grown at an annual rate of 60 percent 
for the past four years, while its trade with Angola has been growing at a rate of 50 
percent for the past three years. While trade with the Lusophone members remains 
modest in comparison with the PRC’s trade with other major countries, such as the U.S. 
or Japan, the potential should not be underestimated. The Lusophone world is 
economically significant for China’s economic objectives; therefore, securing these 
markets is one of China’s top priorities.  
Thirdly, Beijing recognizes the vital importance of countries like Angola to its 
energy security and Brazil’s importance for its trade. China hopes to minimize the 
influence of other powers, particularly the United States, in these countries. Beijing has 
taken advantage of Washington’s neglect towards counties like Guinea Bissau to 
consolidate its presence.3 Beijing has also taken advantage of less-than-friendly relations 
between Washington and some of the African states, but also, to a lesser extent, Brazil, to 
consolidate its influence. Balancing and curtailing American influence in the Lusophone 
world is a major, albeit discreet, objective of China’s strategy, which fits with its overall 
strategy of balancing American dominance at the global level. In addition to concerns 
over the United States, China’s relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries offer the 
potential to shed some additional light on its relation with other major powers. 
Fourthly, by consolidating its presence among the eight Portuguese-speaking 
countries, China hopes to negate Taiwan any diplomatic space. Currently, only tiny Sao 
Tome and Principe has diplomatic ties with Taipei. In recent years, China has increased 
its involvement with Sao Tome through its business interests and other non-official actors 
                                                 
3 “Over a Barrel: China’s Problem with Oil,” Gabe Collins, Jane's Intelligence Review, ChinaWatch 
(March 2008); Gabriel Collins and William Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?” Naval War College 
Review 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 79–95.  
 5
in a clear attempt to establish its position on the island. The discovery of oil fields off the 
coast of Sao Tome is likely to add to Beijing’s efforts to dislodge Taiwan. Massive 
Chinese aid to Guinea Bissau made that country reestablish ties with the PRC in 1997, 
and it has remained in China’s fold ever since. China’s policy of containing Taiwan in the 
Lusophone world is also part of its overall strategy to globally isolate its so-called 
renegade province. 
Finally, China’s growing engagement and involvement with the Portuguese-
speaking world is aimed at enhancing its prestige in world affairs. Soft power has become 
an important element of Beijing’s foreign policy, with its government devoting 
considerable resources to its promotion.4 The spread of Chinese culture, its history, and 
the story of its recent economic success are important elements in creating an image of 
China as a world power. China aims to enhance its soft power in the Lusophone world 
and emerge as an alternative model to Western-inspired democracy. The Chinese model 
of economic development, with its emphasis on economic development and political 
stability, has a great appeal to many in the Lusophone world, particularly its African 
members.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW  
As noted above, there is little or no research on Sino-Lusophone relations. The 
immediate consequence of such a lack of research is that anyone interested in pursuing 
further study will inevitably be confronted with a lack of any meaningful literature on the 
topic. By meaningful, I mean major works, such as books, chapters in edited books, 
journal articles, and major reports. Conversely, a student interested in research on Sino-
Latin American relations would have access to several books on the topic published in 
the past five years. In addition, various preeminent journals, such as Foreign Affairs, 
International Security, and Harvard Asia Quarterly, have published articles on this issue. 
Even the U.S. Congress has held hearings on China’s rising influence in the Americas. 
However, no such body of literature exists for the Portuguese-speaking world.  
                                                 
4 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Changing the World (Yale 
University Press, 2007). 
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Therefore, current research relies heavily on primary sources and the author’s 
own personal experience of having lived and studied in China and work experience in 
various Portuguese-speaking countries. One way to compensate for the limited number of 
secondary sources was to rely heavily on primary sources, such as official documents, 
official correspondence, transcripts of official meetings and summits, some of which 
were attended by the author, and a careful survey of media reports from the Portuguese-
speaking countries and Chinese media available in English, such as the People’s Daily 
and Xinhua News Agency. The author has been collecting information from the above-
mentioned sources since 2004.  
The author was born and lived in Mozambique for over two decades and has 
visited all the Lusophone countries, with the exception of Sao Tome, several times. The 
author is also a graduate of the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University 
and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce Central School. The author has visited China 
several times since 1993, with the last visit taking place in September 2011. Personal 
experience was valuable in compensating for the lack of sources on the topic.  
The multiplicity of sources, in combination with access to official documents, 
increased the reliability of the answers and general outcome of this research. Field trips 
and secondary material in the form of media reports, particularly from the Portuguese-
speaking countries, was also used to reinforce the reliability of this research. 
B. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS 
The main challenge to the research question is that the author was trying to 
measure the success of Chinese penetration and influence in the Lusophone countries. 
What constitutes success? How does one measures success? One could argue that 
growing trade is a good measure of success. For instance, the fact that China is now 
Angola and Brazil’s largest trading partner could be pointed to as a measure of success. 
However, was this success the result of intelligent Chinese foreign and economic 
policies, or simply the result of market force and the compatibility of the economies in 
question? 
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Secondly, how does one define failure? If burgeoning trade between China and 
Brazil is used to indicate success of Beijing’s policy, would not low trade between China 
and Guinea Bissau demonstrate failure? 
Thirdly, considering the diversity of the Lusophone countries, should the same 
measures of success be used across the board? Does China have the same objectives in all 
the countries? For example, while trade between China and Cape Verde has not grown as 
rapidly as trade between China and Angola, Chinese soft power in Cape Verde seems to 
be quite high. Has China failed or succeeded in that country? While trade between 
Angola and China has expanded tremendously, Chinese soft power in Angola is rather 
weak.  
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This research used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Due to 
the nature of the research, qualitative methods were used far more extensively than 
quantitative ones. Official documents, media reports from both the Lusophone world and 
China, and field trips constitute the main supportive elements of the qualitative 
component. However, some of the elements of the qualitative component, such as official 
announcements and agreements, were also used as quantitative elements. 
In addition to be using qualitatively, official documents could also be used in a 
quantitative manner. One could use the number of agreements signed to quantitatively 
demonstrate an increase in bilateral relations and other exchanges. However, one could 
go even deeper and look at textual analysis and specific words. For instance, one could 
look at the appearance of certain news statements, such as “China is a sincere friend,” 
“China helps with no strings attached,” or “China respects our sovereignty” to argue that 
Chinese soft power is high among the elites of Portuguese Africa. This approach would 
be qualitative, but it could also be quantitative if one decides to count the number of 
times the words sincere and friend appeared in official documents and statements. 
In planning this research, I intended not just to use quantitative and qualitative 
methods, but also to allow flexibility in the use of the various elements, viewing them as  
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both qualitative and quantitative. Only small amounts of information could be treated as 
strictly quantitative. For instance, even pure numerical data on trade can have a 
qualitative dimension. 
By relying on official documents and secondary sources, such as media reports, a 
process of triangulation was expected to emerge as the three sources of data are combined 
to reinforce the central propositions of the thesis. Despite the various measures taken to 
minimize bias and increase credibility and reliability, a number of flaws and weaknesses 
were possible. For instance, the possibility of certain Lusophone countries suddenly 
turning more reserved towards China may put into question the notion of success of 
China’s strategy towards the block. There could also be certain elements, such as sudden 
changes in the domestic policies of either the PRC or the Lusophone countries that 
seriously undermine the premises of the current thesis.  
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II. CASE STUDY 
A. THE MACAU FORUM5 
Following Portugal’s handover of Macau to China in 1999, several Portuguese 
diplomats and intellectuals began to debate the nature and future of Sino-Portuguese ties 
and Lisbon’s relation to its former enclave. After 500 years of Portuguese rule, Macau 
was returned to China. What would be Portugal’s ties to its oldest possession? Most 
Portuguese officials and intellectuals who pondered the issue believed that there was very 
little Portugal could do to retain its influence in the territory. 
Despite five centuries of Lusitanian rule, Macau remains strongly Chinese with 
less than 5 percent of its population speaking the language of Camoes. As such, few 
Portuguese after 1999 thought Macau had very little ambitions concerning the future of 
Portugal in Macau. General Rocha Vieira, the last governor of Macau and one of 
Portugal’s most accomplished Asian experts, was primarily concerned with preserving 
Portuguese culture and language and retaining strong cultural ties with the small 
Latinized Macanese community, which, while small, was influential. In 1999, Rocha 
Vieira proposed the creation of the Forum Macau to promote ties between Portugal and 
Macau.6 
In due time, the idea reached the ears of Beijing who had far more ambitious and 
less romantic ideas. In October 2003, the Forum for Economic Cooperation between 
China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macau Forum) was established. The 
Macau Forum is hosted by the Special Administrative Region of Macau and is under the 
auspices of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.7 Most of the funding for the Forum is 
                                                 
5 The author concluded this section of the thesis in early March 2012. This section was then submitted 
to the East Asia Forum Australian National University for publication. The Forum published on March 9, 
2012, a shorter version under the same title is found at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/09/the-macau-
forum-a-chinese-diplomatic-success/. The author would like to thank the Forum for allowing the use of the 
material. 
6 Miguel Santos Neves, “Macau: Post Transaction Priorities,”  Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, December 2009. 
7 For detailed information of the Macau Forum, visit its official website 
http://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo/pt/aboutus.php.  
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provided by the Chinese government, while the wealthy Macau government also 
contributes. The Secretary General of the Forum is always a Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce senior official who reports directly to the minister. There are two deputy 
secretaries: Rita Santos, who is a Macanese of mixed Portuguese-Chinese ancestry, and 
Ambassador Amante Da Rosa, who is one of Cape Verde’s most experienced diplomats.8  
The Lusophone countries, with the exception of Sao Tome and Principe, who has 
diplomatic ties to Taiwan, have a delegate assigned to the Forum’s office in Macau with 
the Macau and Chinese governments covering the expenses of some of the least 
developed countries. In addition to promoting commercial ties between China and the 
Lusophone world, the Forum has also organized training courses in several areas for 
officials from the Lusophone world. Rita Santos and delegations from the Forum 
regularly visit the various Lusophone countries and organize investment seminars.  
The Forum and several Chinese business interests also fund several media 
publications, such as Macauhub and Macau Magazine. These publications report on 
economic and trade matters, and provide free and updated information on the economies 
of the Lusophone countries and China. These publications are now an important source 
for businesses, the government, and the public. They are by far the most respected 
sources on the matter.9 
Every two years, the Forum hosts the China-Lusophone Ministers of Commerce 
meeting where the officials from the two sides discuss economic and trade matters. The 
ministerial delegations are usually followed by business delegations to hold separate 
meetings.10 
Have these efforts paid off for China? Well, let the statistics talk. Between 2003 
and 2006, trade between China and the Lusophone countries more than tripled, growing 
from a little over $10 billion to $34 billion. In 2009, Brazil became China’s largest 
                                                 
8 The author has participated in several initiatives of the Macau Forum and met its secretariat on 
several occasions. 
9 To access these publications, visit the Macauhub website: http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/.  
10 Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries 
Main Activities Report 2008. 
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trading partner in the Southern Hemisphere with bilateral trade reaching $42 billion 
while, in 2010, Sino-Brazilian trade was $56.68 billion.11 After more than eighty years of 
American dominance. China has surpassed the United States as Brazil’s main trading 
partner. It is worth keeping in mind that Brazil is the seventh largest economy on earth. 
Trade between China and Angola reached $27.67 billion in 2011, which made 
Angola China’s second-largest trading partner in Africa after South Africa.12 Since 2008, 
Angola had been China’s largest trading partner in Africa and, in 2007, it was 
temporarily its largest oil supplier.13 Trade with China has also grown rapidly in the other 
Lusophone countries. This was demonstrated in 2010 when Mozambique became the 
third-largest trading partner. China has also become a major source of soft loans for these 
countries, granting Angola a reported $15 billion since 2002, and over $2 billion to 
Mozambique, while Brazil is reported to have received a $10 billion loan to develop its 
Tupi oil fields, believed to be the seventh largest in the world.14 
China has also gained some substantial diplomatic support on issues such as 
human rights, trade, and global warming. Chinese navy pilots trained on the Brazilian 
aircraft carrier Sao Paulo, and both countries jointly produced satellites and a jet liner.15 
Portugal has been sympathetic to the lifting of the EU arms embargo following the 
Tianamen protests and has been a sympathetic voice in international forums.16 
                                                 
11 “Brazil Sets Trade Records Due to Chinese Demand,” NPR, January 2, 2012; “China Overtakes the 
US as Brazil Largest Trading Partner” The Telegraph, May 9, 2009. 
12 “Angola is the second largest African trade partner in Africa in 2011,” Ministry of Commerce, PRC, 
February 4, 2012. 
13 Ana Cristina Alves, “The Oil Factor in Sino-Angolan Relations at the Turn of 21st Century,” South 
African Institute of International Affairs 55 (February 2010); “Angola China’s Largest African Trade 
Partner,” Xinhua, January 19, 2009.  
14 “China lends Angola $15 bn but creates few jobs,” AFP, March 5, 2011; “China, Brazil Agree to 
$10 Billion Loan Exploration,” Bloomberg, May 19, 2009; “Petrobras’ Tupi oil field may hold 8 billion 
barrels,” Bloomberg, November 8, 2007; Todd Moss and Sarah Rose “China’s ExImBank and Africa’s 
New Lending, New Challenges,” Center for Global Development (November 2006). 
15 Russell Hisao, “PLAN Pilots to Train on Brazilian Aircraft Carrier,” China Brief 12 (2009); “Brazil 
and China Sign Agreements on Technology and Aviation,” DEFESA@NET, April 12, 2011; “Brazil and 
China Expand Satellite Program and African Countries Receive data from CBERS) Ministerio da Ciencia e 
Tecnologia do Brasil (Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology) May 20, 2009. 
16 “Portugal Supports Lifting of European Arms Embargo on China,” Publico, October 28, 2010; 
“Lisbon Supports End of European Arms Embargo on China,” Diario de Noticias, November 12, 2004.  
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Of course, the Macau Forum was not the only force behind the impressive 
expansion in Sino-Lusophone relations. However, it certainly played a major and crucial 
role in accelerating the process. With minimal but rather smart investments, China has 
obtained tremendous economic and diplomatic gains throughout the Lusophone world. 
Despite this overall success, Sino-Lusophone relations are not free of controversy. For 
instance, Portugal and Brazil resent China’s growing presence in their traditional spheres 
of influence in Latin America and Africa.17 Brazil has, in the past decade, lodged over 
100 trade complaints to the WTO against China and enacted commercial measures to 
counter what it perceives as unfair practices. While in Angola, there are allegations that 
Chinese investment and loans brought very little jobs. The conference of Angola Bishops 
demanded that Chinese companies employ more Angolans.18 Despite these irritants, 
relations are likely to continue to expand because both China and the Lusophone 
countries have gained tremendously from the partnership. 
There are clear signs of the growing importance that China attaches to the Forum. 
For instance, in the December 2010 Forum meeting, for the very first time in nearly a 
decade of Sino-Lusophone interaction, China was represented at the meeting by Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao, while several Lusophone nations were represented at the level of 
President and Prime Minister. In his opening remarks, the Chinese leader pledge $1 
billion to assist the least developed Lusophone nations and expressed his desire for 
deeper cooperation.19 
                                                 
17 “President Lula Exacerbates Brazilian Chinese Competition for African Market,” ABN, July 8, 
2010.  
18 “Bishops worried about large numbers of Chinese workers in Angola,” Publico, August 3, 2010.  
19 “Wen, China to Assist Poor Portuguese-speaking Countries,” China Daily News November 13 
2010; “A New Era for the Macau Forum,” Revista Macau,  November 2010; “China Creates Fund for 
Portuguese Speaking Countries,” Estada, November 13, 2010.  
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B. CHINA AND MOZAMBIQUE: STEP BY STEP20 
China’s relations with Mozambique dates back to the mid-1960s when, under the 
leadership of Mao Zedong, the People’s Republic of China embarked on an all-out policy 
of supporting independence and other revolutionary movements throughout the world. 
Between 1964 and 1974, the Mozambican people fought the Portuguese colonial army 
for independence. During this period, China supported FRELIMO, the main 
independence movement in the country, by providing it with military training and 
financial support. Several senior FRELIMO leaders were trained in China, while dozens 
of Peoples Liberation Army of China instructors were stationed at Nachingwea in 
neighboring Tanzania to train FRELIMO guerrillas.21 Upon independence, Mozambique 
moved closer to the Soviet Union and Chinese influence remained minimal through the 
Cold War. Through the mid-1990s, Beijing remained a marginal player in Mozambique 
and throughout the continent in general. 
However, by the early 2000s, an expanding Chinese economy created an all new 
set of priorities for Beijing. A growing demand for energy and markets for China’s newly 
established capital and manufacturing became a national priority. In the past three years, 
the People’s Republic of China has been building an impressive position in the former 
Portuguese colony of Mozambique in southern Africa.22 
In 2007, trade between China and Mozambique was a mere $208 million. By 
2010, it reached $690 million, an increase of more than a 100 percent a year. China has 
been investing heavily in infrastructure, mining, and agriculture. Chinese state-owned 
Eximbank granted the Mozambican government more than $2.3 billion for the 
construction of a mega-dam in the central part of the country. Chinese companies have 
                                                 
20 This section of the thesis was completed in late early May 2011 and submitted to the China Brief for 
publication. The China Brief published a slightly different version on May 20 under the title, The Dragon 
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8246f89aeee8aba6. The author would like to thank the China Brief for allowing the use of the material.  
21 Steven F. Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy: The Cases of Angola and Mozambique, 
1961–1993,” The China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 388–422. 
22 Sergio Chichava, “Mozambique and China: From Politics to Business?” Discussion Paper, no. 05, 
2008, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos. 
 14
built roads, bridges, military installations, hospitals, and other infrastructure throughout 
the country. The Chinese government has contributed $160 million to modernize the 
country’s main airport and built several important buildings free of charge; among them 
are the national stadium, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parliament, and the 
country’s largest convention center.23 A Chinese company has also won a $439 million 
contract to build a new residential area near the capital of Maputo.24 
According to the Financial Times, China’s single largest investment in 
Mozambique to date is a $1 billion investment in the coal mining sector by Wuhan Iron 
and Steel.25 In 2010, Mozambique national radio announced that the Chinese company 
Kingho has expressed its intention to invest $5 billion in the country’s growing coal 
sector.26 Following an investment seminar hosted by the Mozambican government in 
Shanghai in June 2010, Chinese business interests pledged up to $13 billion in investment 
for the next 10 years in areas such as infrastructure, mining, agriculture and tourism.27 
Around the same time, Chinese banks announced $165 million in investments. The 
money is to be invested in a cement plant, a cotton processing facility, and agricultural 
projects.  
Chinese business interests have also been investing heavily in the cement sector, 
with Chinese companies investing $78 million in a cement plant in Magude, while CF-
Moz has pledged $38 million for a cement plant in Matituine.28 In 2010, China 
Development Bank granted $110 million to Mozambique and Chinese interests to build 
another cement plant in Beluane in the south of the country. The massive plant is 
expected to produce 1 million tons of cement a year. The growing investment in the 
cement sector aims at dealing with the country’s regular shortages and reducing costs. 
                                                 
23 “Mozambique: China to fund construction of Mpanda Nkuwa dam,” Macauhub, May 19, 2009; 
“Trade between China and Mozambique reaches $690 million in 2010,”  O Pai,” February 7, 2011. 
24 “Chinese Company to Build Housing Complex in Matola, Mozambique,” Mozahub, September 21, 
2011. 
25 “China invests $1 billion in Mozambique coal,” Financial Times, June 24, 2010. 
26 “China Kingho to Invest $5b in Coal Mining Projects in Mozambique,” African Press Agency, July 
22, 2010.  
27 “China to invest $13 billion in Mozambique,” Reuters, August 27, 2010.  
28 “Cement prices to go down in 2013,” Radio Mocambique March 4, 2011. 
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Chinese companies are likely to make significant profits because of the country’s 
growing infrastructure expansion and ongoing construction efforts.  
Direct flights between Mozambique and China are expected to start in 2011; this 
will further increase the growing economic interaction between the two nations.29 China 
is the fastest growing tourism market in the world, with 50 million Chinese traveling as 
tourists in 2010, while Mozambique’s tourism sector is among the fasts growing in the 
world. Chinese tourism companies hope to bring a million Chinese tourists in the next 10 
years, making the PRC the most important source of tourists for the country. There are no 
definitive data on the number of Chinese residing in Mozambique; numbers range from 
as low as 7,000 to as high as 12,000. A large Chinatown is expected to be built in 
Catembe, across the bay from Maputo, where several thousand Chinese are expected to 
reside.  
China has also shown significant interest in the country’s large fertile land as a 
way to meet China’s growing food demand and its shrinking arable land. In May 2008, Li 
Zhengdong, the Director for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
announced that the Chinese government was in negotiations with Mozambique to lease 
land for cereal production, though the Mozambican government denied the report. 
However, in August 2010, following the investment seminar in Shanghai, the Shanghai 
Chamber of Commerce stated that the Mozambican government was offering a yearly 
lease Chinese investors 1 hectare of land for $5 for.30 Chinese business interests from 
Macau were reported to be negotiating the lease of several thousand kilometers of land  
 
 
                                                 
29 “China admits possible air link between Maputo and Shanghai) Radio Mocambique,” August 28, 
2010. 
30 “Go to Africa – Seminar on Investment in Mozambique,” Shanghai Municipal Commission of 
Commercial, June 12, 2010; “Favorable Investment Policy in Mozambique,” Shanghai Business Registry 
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for biofuel production. China has also invested $15 million in an agriculture research 
center in the country and has built three processing plants for various agriculture 
products.  
Several Chinese companies have started prospection studies for all ranges of 
mineral resources, such as diamonds, rubies, gold, iron, and marble. The Chinese have, 
since the early 2000s, been heavily involved in exploiting the country’s rich timber 
resources, importing enormous amounts of timber from that country. Chinese 
involvement in the timber sector in Mozambique is rather controversial. Widespread 
illegal logging saw the Mozambican government cancel several licenses from Chinese 
companies. The Chinese have also been accused of plundering the country’s fisheries, 
particularly for shark fins. It should be mentioned that China is not the only culprit here. 
With the intention of assisting with education and building its soft power, China 
has also provided hundreds of scholarships to Mozambique with more than one hundred 
Mozambican students now pursuing higher education in the PRC. Despite these efforts, 
most Mozambicans still prefer to pursue their studies in the West due to the perceived 
better quality of education and better financial bursaries. This may soon change. Beijing 
has also sent agricultural specialists, doctors, and military advisors to assist the Maputo 
government. Chinese is now being taught at several educational institutions.  
China’s presence is growing fast around several of Mozambique’s neighbors, 
particularly in Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Zambia and Tanzania are hosting two 
of China’s Special Economic Zones in Africa, with Zambia being developed as a major 
mining and agricultural hub. Both Zambia and Zimbabwe are landlocked countries whose 
nearest exits to the sea are the central ports of Mozambique. In July 2010, the author 
wrote in the China Brief that the Chinese were interested in modernizing Mozambican 
harbors to export the goods from their growing ventures in the interior of the continent, 
and that the Mozambican ports of Nacala and Beira were the most likely candidates31.  
                                                 
31 Loro Horta, “China’s Relations with Mozambique: A Miss Blessing,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, April 18, 2008; Lora Horta, “China Building Africa’s Economic Infrastructure: 
SEZ’s and Railroads,” July 22, 2010. 
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On January 3, 2011, the Mozambican media reported that Chinese interests were 
negotiating with the government to modernize and expand the Beira harbor. The Chinese 
investors did not specify how much money they were willing to invest, stating simply 
that they had a lot of money to invest. The spokesperson for the consortium, George 
Wang, stated: 
We have extensive interests in the diamond industry in Zimbabwe so far 
we have been using the land route all the way to Durban. If the Beira 
harbor is modernized, countries like Zambia and Malawi will also use the 
port for it’s much closer than Durban.32 
China has, in the past five years, been modernizing and expanding several ports in 
the Indian Ocean in places like Tanzania, Sir Lanka, and Pakistan. Two out of five 
Chinese SEZs in Africa are in the Indian Ocean, Tanzania, and Mauritius. Mozambique 
lies in a strategically important maritime route, with the Mozambique Channel being an 
important alternative route to the Suez Canal. 
Beijing is not alone in its interest for Mozambique. India and Brazil have begun to 
invest heavily in Mozambique and, just like Beijing, New Delhi’s interests may be 
beyond Mozambique. Indian companies have a strong presence in manufacturing, 
mining, and services. Unlike many Chinese companies, they tend to employee large 
numbers of locals. Some Western academics have argued that China imports large 
numbers of workers from the mainland to Africa due to the lack of skilled workers. 
However, Indian companies investing in the same countries do not seem to have that 
problem, neither do Malaysian, South Korean or Brazilian companies.  
The import of thousands of Chinese workers into Africa has been a source of 
tension between the Chinese and labor unions throughout Africa. However, in the past 
two years, the Chinese government has grown more aware of this problem and has been 
addressing the issue with some degree of success in places like Cape Verde, Namibia, 
and increasingly in Mozambique. Industrial relations between Chinese managers and 
workers have also been very problematic with widespread accusations of racism and 
                                                 
32 “Government and Chinese investors to negotiate viability of Beira port,” Canal De Mocambique, 
January 31, 2011. 
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physical abuse. In 2009, the provincial government of Manica warned the Chinese 
company Henan International Cooperation over its industrial relations record and 
demanded that the Chinese company treat their workers fairly; other local governments 
have expressed similar concerns33. Beijing already faces significant difficulties in 
enforcing its own labor laws in China. Doing so in Africa is an even greater challenge. 
However, as labor costs increase in China, more Chinese companies are moving their 
factories to more stable African countries to take advantage of local cheap labor, just like 
Western companies did in China years ago. 
India has focused its investment in areas where China has also been investing 
heavily, particularly in the mining sector. India has pledged to invest $1 billion in the 
coal sector and has offered $45 million in trading and technology transfer to the country’s 
mining sector.34 In 2010, following President Armando Guebuza’s visit to India, New 
Delhi granted his country a $500 million credit line for infrastructure, mining, and 
agriculture. India has also funded the construction of several important buildings.35 
However, India is clearly losing the race in Africa. The combination of a vibrant 
democracy and a highly bureaucratic system makes the disbursement of large loans slow 
and complicated. In early 2011, Mozambican Prime Minister Aires Ali said that India 
needed to be more efficient and quick at keeping its promises.36  
With the exception of the U.S. Navy, the Indian navy is by far the dominant force 
in the Indian Ocean, and India has been growing quite apprehensive over China’s 
growing presence in East Africa. In 2008, the Indian military established an electronic 
listening center in Madagascar, which is just off the coast of Mozambique and near 
Mauritius, the home of one of China’s SEZs and a home to a large Indian community.37 
In 2007, at the request of the Mozambican government, Indian warships patrolled the 
                                                 
33 “Murder Charges Dropped Against 2 Chinese Mine Managers in Africa,” Associated Press, April 6, 
2011; “Chinese Company Warned Over Labor Relations,” AIM, July 7, 2009. 
34 “India wants to increase investment in the Mozambican coal sector,” O Pai, January 11, 2011. 
35 “India open $500 million credit line for Mozambique,” AIM, September 30, 2010. 
36 “Aires Ali asks Indian for diligence in the release of funds,” A Verdade, March 28, 2011. 
37 “Indian Navy activates listening post, monitoring station in Madagascar Indian Ocean,” India 
Defense, July 18, 2007. 
 19
capital’s coast during the Summit of Heads of State of the African Union. Mozambique is 
important for both China and India from both a resource and an energy point of view, as 
well as from a strategic point of view, because both countries’ navies have expanded their 
interest in the Indian Ocean and in East Africa. This interest is likely to increase and 
conflict may perhaps occur. Recently, a Chinese senior military official and various 
academics have called for the establishment of a naval base in Africa to defend Beijing’s 
growing interests. 38 
Brazil, another rising power, has also been investing heavily in Mozambique and 
in many of the areas where the two Asian giants have been concentrating their efforts. 
Brazilian mining giant CVRD is competing with Chinese and Indian companies for 
Mozambican coal and has invested heavily in the sector. Since 2009, Vale, formerly 
CVRD, has invested $1.3 billion in coalmines in the central provinces of Zambezia and 
Tete, so far excluding Chinese and Indian investment.39 Vale has pledged to invest up to 
$9 billion in Mozambique by 2014.40 According to Brazilian state media, Brazilian 
investment in Mozambique grew 20 times from 2002 to 2008, reaching $4.5 billion. 
Brazilian steel giant CSN has since invested $179 million in a joint venture with 
Australian mining giant Rio Tinto in steel processing plants. Brazilian investors have 
announced their intention to invest up to $6 billion in biofuel and take advantage of the 
Mozambican government allocation of 60,000 hectares of land for foreign investors. In 
early 2012, the Mozambican government offered Brazilian farmers half a million hectares 
of land for lease at low prices.41 
Brazil has been involved economically with Mozambique for decades, resenting 
the growing presence of the newcomers, particularly China. Since April 2009, China has 
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become Brazil’s largest trading partner and many in Brazil are unhappy with China’s 
growing dominance in the local economy and its encroachment on Brazil’s traditional 
markets. In order to balance China, Brazil has entered into joint ventures with Japanese, 
European, and Australian companies while also engaging India.42 
So far, the FRELIMO government, in power since 1975, has been able to play a 
sophisticated balancing game, preventing any one country from having an overwhelming 
dominance over the country. In February 2011, the Mozambican government refused to 
grant India three additional blocks of coal mining, in part due to slow progress in 
previous concessions, and also to prevent that country from dominating this vital sector. 
As pressure grows in China and India for energy resources and other commodities, it 
remains to be seen whether Mozambique will be able to maintain this balancing act. As 
the African saying goes, “when elephants fight, the grass gets trampled.”  
China is fast emerging as the most important economic and diplomatic player in 
Mozambique, bringing billions in investments and asking no questions. While there have 
been a few issues of tension, such as Chinese workers and environmental degradation, 
Sino-Mozambican relations have been largely beneficial for both countries. China has 
provided Mozambique with billions in aid at a time many Western nations neglected the 
country and spent their time with moralizing and sometimes outright hypocritical 
sermons about transparency and human rights. While the West has closed its markets to 
Mozambican agriculture products with heavy subsidies, China has exempted 420 
Mozambican agricultural products from tariffs. At a time when the West is facing a 
serious economic crisis, China and other emerging powers are becoming crucial for the 
wellbeing of several African nations. Sino-Mozambican relations are likely to grow even 
further with Beijing emerging as the main economic and strategic player in Mozambique 
and in East Africa. However, riots, high crime rates, and poor infrastructure have 
hindered an even faster growing expansion of Chinese influence in the country; still, 
China is now quickly replacing the continent’s traditional former colonial powers as the 
main actor. 
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This new reality was vividly symbolized when, in October 2011, China 
announced it was going to fund the $300 million construction of the Maputo-Catembe 
Bridge after Portugal withdrew its funding as a result of the economic crisis. 
C. ANGOLA AND THE PARADOX OF CHINESE POWER 
Angola is clearly China’s most important relation in the African continent, with 
bilateral trade between the two nations reaching a staggering $25 billion in 2009.43 
Angola is Beijing’s main trading partner in Africa and its main source of foreign oil 
imports, providing China with 6.5 metric tons of crude oil in the first three months of 
2008. Since 2002, Chinese state-owned banks have provided Angola with $15 billion in 
soft loans for hundreds of projects.44 
The Angolan government is paying these loans with oil exports to China and by 
awarding contracts for such projects to Chinese companies. Chinese companies have 
been awarded numerous contracts throughout the vast country, such as building railroads, 
roads, ports, power plants, stadiums, and military installations. In 2010, China granted 
Angola a $1 billion loan to revive the country’s agricultural sector. Angola also has the 
world’s fourth largest diamond fields; in 2009, China surpassed the U.S. as its main 
buyer.45 Dozens of high-level Chinese delegations have visited Angola in recent years, 
while nearly every senior official in Angola has paid a call to Beijing, including long-
term President Eduardo dos Santos.  
Chinese loans and companies have contributed to an impressive resurgence of the 
country’s economy and infrastructure after nearly thirty years of civil war. When, in the 
early 2000s, Western institutions, such as the World Bank, imposed severe conditions on 
assistance to Angola and dispensed long and sometimes hypocritical speeches on 
transparency and accountability, along came the Chinese with billions in loans and no 
questions asked.  
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Therefore, as some observers have predicted, one would expect that Angola 
would fall under greater Chinese control. While China has gained an impressive 
economic presence in Angola, its political and diplomatic influence is growing weaker by 
the day, and its soft power is rather weak. Along with billions in loans, came thousands 
of Chinese workers. There is now an estimated 100,000 Chinese believed to be residing 
in Angola.46 While Chinese companies have won numerous lucrative contracts, very few 
jobs have been created for the Angolans.47 Some Western scholars have claimed that 
China brought thousands of workers to Angola because the country lacked skilled 
workers. Portuguese, Brazilian, Indian, and other countries’ companies do not seem to 
have that problem. The most insulting excuse was put by a Chinese scholar from the 
state-run Academy of Social Sciences at a conference that was hosted in Lisbon in June 
2008. These scholars claimed that China has brought thousands of workers to Angola 
because many Angolan men were mutilated during the twenty-seven years of civil war 
and were not able to work. In November 2009, the author wrote an article for Yale Global 
Online Magazine in which he discussed the growing tensions between local Africans and 
the growing number of Chinese migrants and the potential for conflict. A year later, 
several Angolan media outlets and the world’s leading media seemed to share the same 
concerns. 48 
In August 2010, the conference of Angolan Bishops expressed its concern over 
the growing number of Chinese workers in Angola, while state-owned Angolan oil 
company Sonangol imposed restrictions on the number of Chinese workers.49 There have 
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quality of Chinese construction, with the most notorious case being that of the collapse of 
the Luanda general hospital shortly after its inauguration. Several roads and other 
infrastructure have had similar problems.50  
Small- and medium-scale traders also resent the thousands of Chinese traders who 
were quickly putting them out of business. Attacks on Chinese citizens are not 
uncommon, and they have led the Chinese Embassy to lodge several protests. Chinese 
companies have also been accused of using child labor in several rice farms around the 
country, as well as several other irregularities.51 Anti-Chinese sentiment has, on 
occasions, reached ridiculous proportions with several negative reports in the local media 
expanding on the insults with claims that Chinese cannibals and sodomizers are preying 
on young Angolans. 52 
While most resentment is felt at the lower levels of society, Angolan elites are 
growing more concerned over their self-created overdependence on China and have 
begun to take steps to balance Chinese dominance. In the past two years, several 
contracts that were initially to go to Chinese companies have been given to Indian, 
Brazilian, American, and European companies. While China remains and is likely to 
remain the country’s main economic partner, the Dos Santos government has 
strengthened diplomatic and security ties with the United States, Europe, Brazil, and 
other Asian powers, such as India. The United States remains the main importer of 
Angolan oil, a situation the Angolans have no desire to change. The Angolan government 
has also awarded several oil concessions to Brazilian, Indian, and European companies. 53  
In contrast to Chinese companies, American giants, such as Chevron, have 
employed thousands of Angolans and engaged in several community beneficent projects, 
investing a total of $160 million in such projects. Chevron and its subsidiaries in Angola 
employ an estimated 3,500 long-term Angolan workers, making that company the single 
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largest foreign employer in the country.54 Instead of using the excuse that Angola lacks 
qualified human resources, Chevron has been investing in the training and education of 
national staff for several years. However, this is not to say that American and Western 
companies have a perfect record, as shown by the Angolan government suing Chevron 
over environmental violations.  
Despite China’s tremendous economic gains, most Angolans still prefer to go to 
the United States and Europe for their education. Angolan bureaucrats, diplomats, and 
military officers are not being educated in China, but rather in the West, and these are the 
people who shape the country’s policy now and into the future. The hardest source of 
friction between Angola, the U.S., and its Western allies is the issue of human rights and 
corruption, which has led, on occasion, to diplomatic tension. For instance, some 
observers have noticed that the court cases against American oil companies for alleged 
environmental violations are in retaliation for American criticism of such matters. 
Despite these irritants, American-Angolan relations have improved remarkably in recent 
years and American oil companies have expanded their presence in the country. If one 
takes into account the fact that Washington only recognized the ruling MPLA 
government in 1992, U.S.-Angolan relations have indeed witnessed a remarkable 
improvement.  
The Angolan government has played a smart and sophisticated balancing game, 
allowing China to assume a preponderant role at a time when the West scorned the 
country and obtained billions in loans without having to make difficult reforms. Now, 
with its oil economy booming and the world’s fourth-largest diamond fields, Angola is 
exploiting other options. In part in reaction to China’s overwhelming position in Angola, 
Angola’s traditional partners, such as the U.S., Portugal, Brazil, and the EU, have 
increased their commitment to Angola, further strengthening the Dos Santos regime and 
balancing Chinese influence.  
While many in the West have expressed concern over China’s presence in 
Angola, China’s fast dominance of the continent had led many countries to re-engage the 
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West and other emerging powers, such as India and Brazil, in order to balance China’s 
preponderance. This is not to suggest that Angola sees China necessarily as a threat, but 
rather that it believes it has more to win by diversifying its relations.  
While Angola initially encouraged China to assume a leading role in its economy, 
China’s rapid dominance of the country made the Angolan leadership concerned over its 
overreliance on China. Ironically, China seems to be the victim of its own success. By 
gaining an over-dominant position in Angola, China weakened its political and 
diplomatic positions, allowing other powers to re-engage. Growing economic power did 
not translate itself into diplomatic and political influence. Eager to secure energy 
resources, Beijing has established an impressive presence in Angola. However, its 
growing economic dominance has weakened other dimensions of its power, and here lies 
the paradox of Chinese power.  
The United States and other nations with interest in Africa should not be too 
concerned over a possible Chinese takeover, and should continue to play on their 
advantages—including better labor standards, better technology, and educational and 
cultural appeal—while abstaining from the usual moral sermons. For in the end, China 
may have bitten off more than it can chew. China has provided vital support to Angola, 
particularly in the early 2000s, when the West was not forthcoming. It is unlikely that 
Angola would have recovered so fast from the war without Chinese assistance. Who 
could have loaned Angola $15 billion in eight years? Overall, Angola has benefited from 
its ties to Beijing. However, there is much room for improvement on both sides.  
With an ever-expanding oil industry, large diamond fields, and reports of 
extensive deposits of natural gas, Angola is fast emerging as a power to be reckoned 
with, second only to South Africa. A legacy of thirty years of civil war, where Cuban and 
South African troops were involved in the thousands, has given Angola one of the largest 
and most combat-experienced armies in Africa. A rising regional power, such as Angola, 
is unlikely to accept a dependent position in relation to China.  
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D. CHINA AND CAPE VERDE: A VERY DIFFERENT RELATION 
China first established diplomatic relations with the West African archipelago 
nation of Cape Verde in April 1976.55 Ties remained friendly and courteous in 
subsequent years, but were largely confined to intermittent cultural exchanges and rare 
visits to Cape Verde by middle ranking Chinese officials. China had hardly any economic 
interests in the archipelago nation of some 300,000 inhabitants, and Cape Verde’s 
complete lack of natural resources made the islands a low priority in Chinese foreign 
policy. Nonetheless, China kept a diplomatic presence in order to prevent Taiwan from 
gaining entree. 
The task of barring Taiwanese influence was made easier by Cape Verde’s 
relative invulnerability to Taipei’s “checkbook diplomacy.” Despite its disadvantages, 
Cape Verde is something of a success story in terms of nation-building. Relying on a 
large and well-educated diaspora in the United States and Europe, good governance, and 
a pragmatic approach to foreign relations, Cape Verde has become one of the wealthiest 
nations in sub-Saharan Africa. Its GDP per capita stands at $6,000 and the country’s 
health and education systems are among Africa’s best.56 
China’s engagement in Cape Verde began to intensify in the mid-1990s, with the 
arrival of small-scale private Chinese investors. Their numbers were few at first, but 
increased steadily as the local economy prospered and stories of their success reached 
home. 57 This investment pattern is quite different from that seen in the oil-rich countries, 
such as Angola or Sudan, where large state-owned Chinese companies led the way. 
Typically the head of a small business (baihuo in Chinese)—usually the head of the 
family—would move to Cape Verde, accompanied by a male relative to assist him. They 
would set up the business, and if things went well, other family members would join 
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them to expand and diversify the enterprise.58 This type of investment continues, and an 
estimated 300 Chinese shops can now be found in Cape Verde, concentrated on the 
islands of Santiago and Sao Vicente. Rather impressive if one takes into account that the 
country has a population of just over half a million.59 
As is the case with other parts of Africa, reliable statistics on the number of 
Chinese in Cape Verde are hard to come by, but a Cape Verdean official estimates that as 
many as 4,000 Chinese nationals now live there “in one way or another.” This is a large 
number, considering the country’s small population; and the Chinese foreign community 
is second in size only to the Portuguese. 60  
Now that China’s small investors have shown the way, larger investors are 
following. The tourism sector is a big draw in view of Cape Verde’s proximity to major 
European tourist hot spots, such as the Spanish Canary Islands and the Portuguese islands 
of Madeira and Porto Santo. In early 2007, Macau millionaire David Chaw announced a 
$100 million project to build a massive entertainment park, with a casino, restaurants, 
nightclubs, hotels, and a marina, on the islet of Santa Maria, just off Praia, the capital, to 
be completed in 2009. He pledged a further $300 million in coming years in major 
infrastructure projects in the capital, including power plants, roads, and office buildings. 
Chaw’s role in Cape Verde highlights the increasing involvement of Macau business 
tycoons in Lusophone Africa, including Angola and Mozambique, and even in war-torn, 
narcotics-infested Guinea Bissau. 
Several Macanese business tycoons, including Stanley Ho, one of the richest men 
in the world, have requested permits to establish casinos on the island. Macau is today the 
largest gambling city on earth, having beaten Las Vegas several times. 61 
However, having contained a serious narcotic problem and organized crime just a 
few years ago, Cape Verdean society is highly divided over the benefits of establishing 
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casinos. Cape Verde was used as a major transit route for narcotics coming from South 
America into Europe and, while the situation has improved, the problem is not totally 
resolved. There are fears that establishing a casino industry would bring money 
laundering and bring back the drug barons. The church also fears the negative social and 
moral effects in a society that is still struggling with unemployment. 
For over more than five decades, Stanley Ho has demonstrated his ability of 
taking advantage of new opportunities well ahead of the competition. He is reported to 
have invested in a casino on Caravela Island in narcotics-infested Guinea Bissau and 
purchased a 60 percent stake in that country’s only viable bank, the Banco da Africa 
Ocidental (BAO). Now his attention is turning to Cape Verde. In 2007, the U.S. 
government put Stanley Ho on its list of major international organized crime figures and 
banned him from entering the United States.62 It will be interesting to watch how 
successfully he fares in Cape Verde, since the nearby Canary Islands, and to a lesser 
extent Madeira, are well known for their organized crime syndicates with links to 
powerful crime families of the Corsican and Sicilian mafias.  
To date, the Chinese “invaders” have generally been welcomed by the Cape 
Verde population. Cheap Chinese commodities, such as clothing, shoes, and domestic 
household items, cost considerably less than comparable goods coming from Portugal 
and the EU zone. The new arrivals have also benefited the housing market by renting 
property on an unprecedented scale to establish their businesses. The rent for a small 
shop in downtown Praia has now reached as high as $2,000-$3,000 a month, much to the 
joy of the local owners.63 
However, there have been some complaints from local unions over low salaries 
about long working hours in Chinese-owned establishments, who are also sometimes 
accused of paying only half the average national wage. A few strikes have taken place. 
Local business owners, meanwhile, have complained of unfair Chinese practices that are 
putting them out of business and killing off the already small indigenous business class. 
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However, the Cape Verde government is taking a benevolent view of the Chinese role, 
which it views as healthy for the economy. On the occasion of one small shop-worker 
strike, the Minister of Labor said that “local unions should adapt themselves to the 
realities of a global economy.”64 
This does not mean that Cape Verde will become a mere client of Beijing. Cape 
Verde has traditionally been very close to the west, and there are more Cape Verdeans 
living in the United States and Europe than in the country itself. Cape Verde is one of the 
most Latinized nations in Africa—a legacy of 500 years of Portuguese colonization. Its 
population is overwhelmingly Catholic and of mixed European and African background, 
speaking a Creole language based on Portuguese. The majority of Cape Verde’s elites are 
still being educated in Portugal’s universities, such as the University of Coimbra and the 
University of Lisbon, as well as in other Western schools. To this day, the national 
currency is the escudo, the old Portuguese currency, which was abandoned by Portugal 
itself when it joined the Euro zone. 
Nonetheless, China’s influence will continue to grow. China’s large state-owned 
corporations are beginning to show interest, and the Chinese government is stepping 
forward in a major way with funding. The first major state-owned investment came in 
October 2003, when the China Building Material Industrial Corporation for Foreign 
Economic-Technical Cooperation signed a contract with the Cape Verde government to 
build a large cement plant at a cost of $55 million. The factory will be the country’s 
largest such facility and is expected to produce 350,000 tons of cement per year, 
transforming Cape Verde from a net cement importer to an exporter. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government is funding the construction of the national 
parliament, a government palace, a national stadium, the national library, and a national 
auditorium. It is worth noting that China has a particular taste for building preeminent 
buildings that symbolize sovereignty. In Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Timor-
Leste, Laos, and several other developing nations, China has funded and built 
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Presidential Palaces, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, parliament buildings, and national 
stadiums.65 This seems to be motivated by Beijing’s desire to make its presence felt and 
increase its prestige. This also ensures the gratitude of local governments. After all, as 
they sit in their comfortable offices, they will unwillingly be reminded that China made 
that possible. 
China has also paid for the construction of the country’s only dam, while an 
additional two dams are being discussed. In view of Cape Verde’s severe water 
shortages, the dam is highly welcomed by the government and people. The fact that 
several Western nations refused to assist the arid nation in its dam building project further 
won local gratitude and enhanced Beijing’s prestige.66 China is providing a fleet of 
vessels to connect Cape Verde’s eight dispersed and poorly linked islands; offering 100 
scholarships for Cape Verdean students; and deploying an eight-member medical team on 
a regular basis to Praia hospital, the country’s main health facility. It has pledged to build 
a fish processing center and make substantial investments in that sector. In addition, 
China has cancelled Cape Verde’s bilateral debt. 
In July 2007, the Chinese Deputy Minister of Commerce visited Cape Verde to 
discuss ways of improving tourism, tourist infrastructure, and freight handling. This was 
followed in October 2007 by an agreement signed by the Chinese Ambassador to Cape 
Verde, Wu Yuanshuan, and Cape Verde's Economy Minister, Jose Brito, pledging to 
make Cape Verde a major destination for Chinese tourists. With its warm climate and 
idyllic palm-lined beaches, Cape Verde is well poised to tap into the burgeoning Chinese 
tourist market. Political stability and low levels of crime and corruption only increase its 
selling potential as a tourist destination. 
Cape Verde tried very hard to host one of the five “economic cooperation zones” 
China intends to create in Africa.67 In late 2007, the Chinese ambassador stated that the 
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island of Sao Vicente was high on the list because of the quality of its infrastructure, 
which is, in part, the result of recent Chinese investment. 68 The Sao Vicente special 
economic zone would be primarily developed as a major fish processing center to cater to 
the various Chinese fleets operating in the Atlantic. China also hopes to make the island a 
transit point for replenishment and logistical support for the thousands of Chinese ships 
crossing the South Atlantic on their way to Europe. On the other side of the South 
Atlantic, China is investing heavily in Brazilian ports, such as Salvador in the state of 
Bahia. However, in the end, Cape Verde was not selected to host the Chinese zone. 
Despite this, China has remained committed to Cape Verde’s development. Since 
2002, China has granted the country over $80 million in soft loans. In 2009, MacauHub 
announced that China was planning significant investments in infrastructure, such as 
shipyards, public housing, and cement plants. This investment is worth over $240 
million.69 If these plans materialize, this will be a major investment and is likely to 
greatly assist the small nation. The Cape Verde government has also been actively 
lobbying Beijing for further funding to develop port infrastructure.  
In March 2012, the Cape Verdean Ambassador to Beijing announced that China 
and Cape Verde were going to launch a new era of “more direct cooperation.” According 
to Julio Morais, the plan to transform Cape Verde into a fishing and shipping hub for 
West Africa and the south Atlantic is at the top of the agenda. At the time of this 
research, Cape Verde’s Minister of Finance, Cristina Duarte, was expected to visit China 
on the third week of March 2012, where, with other officials, she is expected to meet the 
Director of the China National Development Bank, a major loan provider to developing 
nations.70 
China has also, in recent years, increased its defense and security cooperation 
with Cape Verde and has trained dozens of military and police officers. Cape Verde is in 
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the process of acquiring two maritime patrol helicopters from China and has already 
acquired patrol boats and light weapons. China has also donated computers and other 
office material to the country’s security services.71 
The Cape Verde example shows that China’s economic relations with Africa are 
becoming more sophisticated and multidimensional. The stereotypical view in some 
Western quarters is that China and Chinese businesses are only interested in raw 
materials and fast profits in Africa and are best able to succeed in despotic and 
internationally isolated countries, such as Zimbabwe or Sudan. This is a rather simplistic 
view. True, there are many instances of predatory behavior on the part of Chinese 
capitalists, both state and private. Today, however, Chinese business is increasingly 
adaptable and able to thrive, even in well-governed countries traditionally tied to the 
West. 
The second lesson that emerges from the Cape Verde case is that small-scale 
Chinese private businesses may fast be emerging as the most dynamic element of China’s 
engagement with Africa. It was the early success of private Chinese businesspeople in 
Cape Verde, after all, that drew the attention of larger investors and of the Chinese 
government, opening the way for the flourishing relationship that exists today.  
E. GUINEA BISSAU: A RISK INVESTMENT 
Since 1998, the West African nation of Guinea Bissau has experienced 
tremendous instability with several military coups and foreign intervention. In March 
2009, President Nino Vieira was assassinated by rebellious army soldiers in what was 
rumored to be a dispute over the drug trade.72 By 2005, the country has won the 
distinction of becoming Africa’s first narco-state.73 Despite all these risks, Chinese 
interests, both state and private, have continued building a presence in the country. 
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Until recently, the People’s Republic of China’s main objective in Guinea Bissau 
was merely to keep separatist Taiwan from luring the fledgling state to its side. In other 
words, Beijing’s presence was intended to prevent Taiwan’s checkbook diplomacy. 
Guinea-Bissau shocked China in 1990, when it switched diplomatic recognition to Taipei 
after 26 years of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. The switch 
was particularly resented because Beijing had been one of Guinea-Bissau’s most 
enthusiastic supporters in its twelve-year struggle for independence from Portugal. The 
Chinese had trained many of Guinea-Bissau’s guerrilla leaders, including the president at 
the time, Joao Bernardo “Nino” Viera, and had provided extensive diplomatic support. 
The fact that the party in power when the switch took place was the PAIGC (Party for the 
Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), which had been founded on Marxist-Leninist 
principles and for decades had close party relations with the Chinese Communist Party, 
further enraged Beijing.74 But, with the Cold War over and the Western countries 
seemingly dominant, the PAIGC, like other Marxist-oriented parties, was liberalizing the 
economy and moving toward multi-party elections. Taipei saw its opportunity and 
offered Guinea-Bissau’s leaders a deal they could not to refuse. 
It did not take China long to bring its “old friend” back into fold; less than a year 
later, the Bissau government abandoned Taiwan and restored full diplomatic ties with the 
PRC. Since then, the PRC has decided not to take any more chances with Guinea-Bissau 
and has steadily expanded its presence in the country—despite the fact that China has 
hardly any immediate economic interests at stake. Beijing’s policy towards Guinea 
Bissau is one of minimal engagement, just enough to prevent Taiwan from returning. 
Other small benefits include Guinea Bissau’s support for China on issues such as human 
rights at forums like the UN General Assembly. 
Beijing aims at completely isolating Taiwan internationally, a strategy that has 
grown more aggressive as Chinese power rises. By 2010, only 18 countries had 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan, mostly small states in the Pacific and Central America. 
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|Over the longer term, China may gain access to important oil reserves, if Guinea-
Bissau’s hopes for major discoveries materialize.75 
Restoring ties with Guinea-Bissau was an important win for China, and in the 
years since, the PRC has intensified its efforts to isolate Taiwan worldwide, targeting 
Taipei’s most committed and long-time supporters, such as the Central American states 
that had been loyal to Taiwan for decades. In June 2007, Costa Rica, after 58 years of 
relations with Taiwan, finally abandoned its old friend and established diplomatic ties 
with China.76 In the Portuguese-speaking world, China has succeeded in isolating Taiwan 
from all but one of the eight of members of the Cumunidade dos Paises de Lingua 
Portuguesa (CPLP), Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries), and judging by 
Beijing’s continuous efforts in relation to Africa’s tiny Sao Tome and Principe, it may be 
just a matter of time before Taiwan is completely pushed out of the Lusophone world. 
While China’s immediate goal in the country is to contain Taiwan, Beijing has 
been increasing its aid to the country. China believes that the country will eventually 
stabilize; when that happens, Chinese investment will pour in. Therefore, China believes 
that building a minimal presence when very few others are willing to do so will be 
advantageous when stability finally arrives. There is a long-term approach element in 
China’s policy towards Guinea Bissau. This long-term approach will be noticed in the 
case of Timor-Leste. It is also worth knowing that China has very little competition in the 
country, as only Portugal, the former colonial power, has any meaningful presence. The 
United States closed its embassy in 1999. 
China terms its assistance to Guinea Bissau and the developing world in general 
ajuda sincera e gratuita (sincere and friendly help). China argues that its aid, unlike the 
West, is free from pre-conditions and has no strings attached.77 In part, this is true for 
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Beijing, which usually abstains from interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. 
Issues such as human rights, labor rights, and the environment are not at the top of 
China’s priorities. However, like any other state, China’s foreign policy is aimed at 
enhancing the interests of the country, whatever they may be. 
In November 2006, China announced it was going to fund the construction of a 
massive dam in Guinea-Bissau, 200 kilometers from the capital Bissau, at a cost of $60 
million. The Ceba River dam, the first such structure in the country, will be vital to 
sustaining Guinea-Bissau’s agriculture-based economy and meeting its future energy 
needs. Other major infrastructure projects include a deep-water port in Buba, which will 
be the country’s largest such facility, the rehabilitation of Guinea-Bissau’s two main 
highways, and the construction of a bridge over the Farin River.78 
As in the cases of Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Timor-Leste, discussed in the 
next section, the PRC has also funded very visible and symbolic buildings that greatly 
contribute to enhancing its prestige and visibility as a major player. Under its ajuda 
amigavel e gratuita (free and friendly help) assistance program, China has offered to 
build the national parliament building, rehabilitate the presidential palace that was 
damaged during the 1998 civil war, and construct a six-story central government 
building, the largest project in the capital. Beijing is also putting up a 1,000-unit public 
housing project. In August 2007, funding was announced for additional construction, 
including a justice palace and the rehabilitation of schools and health facilities.79 
Other assistance includes the provision of 100 scholarships for local students to 
attend Chinese universities, and $400,000 in humanitarian assistance to the northern areas 
of the country along the border with Senegal, where a significant refugee problem 
remains as a result of the civil war. A 2,000-ton gift of Chinese rice was much welcomed 
in view of the exorbitant price of the staple crop in the local market. It allowed the regime 
                                                 
78 “Stability in Guinea Bissau Allows for the Relaunch of Buba and Boe Projects,” Macauhub, July 
18, 2011. 
79 See remarks by Chinese Ambassador to Guinea Bissau on the occasion of the opening of the newly 
rebuilt Presidential Palace posted at the website of the Embassy of The People’s Republic of China in 
Guinea Bissau. Accessed July 16, 2011, at http://gw.china-embassy.org/por/; “Guinea Bissau, China Begins 
Construction of Military Hospital,” Lusa, April 30, 2009. 
 36
to address the most basic immediate needs of the population while buying vital time for 
further shipments to arrive. This Chinese gesture may have prevented serious civil unrest, 
and it certainly enhanced China’s image in the eyes of the government and the people. In 
August 2007, this first rice shipment was followed by an even larger one of 30,000 tons 
and, in early 2010, an additional 2,500 tons were gifted. To help stimulate Guinea-
Bissau’s economy, China has exempted 442 agricultural products from Guinea Bissau 
from export tariffs to Chinese80 This initiative has also been extended to Mozambique 
and several other African countries. 
Beijing has provided funds for direct budget assistance to Guinea-Bissau, 
including a $4 million donation to assist the government in paying delayed salaries to its 
civil servants and $1.2 million donation to help the country host the CPLP heads of state 
summit in Bissau in July 2005. China has also assisted Bissau with some of its diplomatic 
representation expenses in Beijing by providing its diplomatic mission with vehicles and 
office equipment free of charge. Large numbers of public servants and some military 
officers are expected to head to the PRC for training, and the numbers of Chinese 
assistance personnel in Guinea-Bissau are expected to increase, particularly in the areas 
of agriculture, health, and fisheries. The health sector is another area where China has 
provided useful and much needed assistance. In addition to sending medical teams, a 
crucial help considering the country’s limited numbers of doctors, the PRC has given 
medical supplies and equipment. China’s main health project is the rehabilitation of the 
Canchungo regional hospital, 70 kilometers from the capital, at a cost of $3.5 million. 
In 2006, Guinea-Bissau become the first country to sign a deep water fisheries 
agreement with China, opening the door for large numbers of Chinese fishing vessels to 
operate in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Due to the unique nature of the country’s 
coastal ecosystem, the fisheries agreement has raised some concerns among 
environmentalists. The region of greatest concern is the Bijagos archipelago, which 
UNESCO has declared a Biosphere Ecology Reserve. Environmentalists worry that the 
Guinea-Bissau navy will be unable to monitor the large numbers of Chinese fishing 
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vessels that will eventually be deployed. Currently, the country possesses just two patrol 
boats at an uncertain state of operational readiness to cover a 350-kilometer coastal area 
with 80 islands and reefs. These fears seem to be justified. In order to dispel concerns, in 
2011, four Chinese ships were apprehended for illegal fishing. 81 Chinese vessels have 
also been caught fishing illegally in Mozambique and Timor-Leste, particularly for shark 
fins.82 
However, it is the oil sector that seems to be of greatest interest for both China 
and Guinea-Bissau. Since the last years of Portuguese colonization, there have been 
numerous reports of significant oil reserves along the coast. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
various French and American oil companies were reported to have approached the 
Portuguese government for oil concessions. However, the fascist and isolationist 
Portuguese government of the day, with economic policies that had made Portugal the 
poorest nation in Western Europe, resisted such moves. Chinese experts were expected to 
start major seismic studies to fully assess the true potential of the reported oil reserves. At 
the time of this writing, no further details are available on whether China has started any 
activities in the waters of the country in search of oil.  
Like the deep fisheries agreement, the oil exploration plans have raised 
environmental concerns. There are fears that some of the areas where reserves may be 
located are too close to the Bijagos. If significant oil reserves are indeed found in or near 
the Bijagos, will an impoverished Guinea-Bissau be able to resist the temptation to drill? 
Or will it choose to protect its environment and one of the world’s natural treasures? This 
remains to be seen. 
While most Chinese investment in Guinea-Bissau is through enterprises linked to 
the Chinese government, some major Chinese private investors are beginning to take 
notice of the country’s potential. Macao casino tycoon Stanley Ho has invested in a 
casino on Caravela Island in the Bijagos archipelago. One may wonder about the wisdom 
of building a casino in a UNESCO-protected area and about the benefits of building 
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casinos generally in one of the world’s poorest nations. Another major investment by Ho 
was the purchase of a 60 percent stake in Guinea-Bissau’s only viable bank, the Banco da 
Africa Ocidental (BAO).83 
As noted above, the United States closed its embassy in Bissau fourteen years 
ago, and Guinea Bissau cannot afford an embassy in Washington. The mutual lack of 
official representation in the two capitals is counterproductive, considering the growing 
importance of Guinea-Bissau as a transit point for the narcotics trade from Latin America 
to Europe. The issue may well become a source of contention between Washington and 
the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and Bissau on the other. In this context, 
China’s growing presence in Guinea-Bissau and its aid programs may be beneficial for 
the United States. By helping develop and stabilize the country, China is helping the EU 
and the U.S. in its overall goal to contain the drug trafficking. 
At one point, the international community discussed the possibility of imposing 
sanctions on Guinea Bissau and the U.S. has listed several military and government 
officials as drug traffickers. However, the EU, particularly Portugal and France, argued 
that sanctions will make things worse. It is rather unlikely that Beijing would join any 
hostile measure towards Guiney Bissau. Indeed, China has been a sympathetic voice in 
the United Nations towards Guiney Bissau by discouraging sanctions.84 However, it is 
unlikely that China will use its veto power as it did to protect Lydia and Syria. Guinea 
Bissau is such a marginal country for Beijing that it is not worth the trouble. All Bissau 
can do is to turn to Taiwan but having relations with a country that is under UN sanctions 
is likely to be a great burden on Taiwan rather than an asset. 
However, unless international pressure reaches a turning point, Beijing seems to 
have adopted a long-term commitment towards Guinea-Bissau, and is likely to conclude 
that, whatever Washington and the Europeans may do, maintaining and expanding this 
commitment is a risk worth taking. While close ties with a narco-state may create some 
international embarrassment for the PRC, it is unlikely that Beijing will reconsider its 
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policy. After all, as the Burma case suggests, Guinea-Bissau is not the first country 
whose state is heavily involved in the drug trade and under UN sanctions to be a close 
friend of China.85 Nonetheless, China could pressure Guinea-Bissau officials to move 
against the drug trade if it becomes too much of an international issue. There is evidence 
that China has supported drug eradication efforts in Burma—though most likely because 
narcotics from that country were a threat to China itself. 
The fact that Beijing is taking great risks in its dealings with Guinea-Bissau when 
others are shying away may pay handsome dividends in the future, particularly in the oil 
sector. Major oil deposits may not be found, and cordial relations with a regime that may 
be tied to the international narcotics trade could one day prove a liability in world 
opinion. For now, however, China seems to feel that these are risks worth taking. So far, 
China’s assistance to Guinea-Bissau seems to have significantly enhanced its prestige 
inside Guinea-Bissau, and to have won gratitude from the government and the people at 
large. 
While the problems of Guinea Bissau are far from over, in the past year or so, 
some sense of normality is slowly taking over. As mentioned above, China believes that 
eventually the country will stabilize and, when that happens, previous Chinese 
engagement will give Beijing an advantage. Indeed, in mid-March 2012, two large 
Chinese business delegations visited the country to re-launch various projects started in 
2006 and then abandoned as a result of internal strife and to start new ones. The Chinese 
have expressed their intention to build a commercial harbor, power plants, agriculture, 
and small industry. 86 The Bissau government and its Chinese partners intend to make use 
of the $1 billion fund established by the Chinese government in late 2010 to assist the 
least-developed Lusophone nations. Chinese business and government tend to have a 
long-term approach and are very persistent. Perhaps now, China is about to finally collect 
on its investments. 
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F. TIMOR-LESTE: CHINA’S SOUTHEAST ASIAN OUTPOST? 
The half island nation of Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) lies at the eastern 
most corner of Southeast Asia, sandwiched between its two large neighbors, Australia 
and Indonesia. After 400 years of inept Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of brutal 
Indonesian occupation, Timor-Leste gained its independence in 2002, following a UN 
sponsored referendum. 87 In its short existence as an independent nation, the small 
territory has been witnessing a growing competition between the world’s two most 
powerful nations, the United States and the People’s Republic of China. 
Timor-Leste is not strategically important for either of the superpowers. However, 
both consider their growing presence in the territory as a barometer for their global 
reputation.  
In recent years, Chinese presence in Timor-Leste has witnessed a significant 
surge. China has built, free of charge, the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, the 
Presidential palace, the defense force headquarters, and 100 houses for the military. As 
with the cases of Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Guinea Bissau, China has funded and 
built very preeminent buildings on the island that give Beijing prestige. These types of 
projects give Beijing a visibility that sometimes is well beyond its real influence. 
A Chinese company was awarded a $378 million contracted to build two power 
plants, while state-owned Poly Arms Manufactory sold two 52-meter patrol gunboats to 
the young nation. Timor has also purchased assault rifles and non-lethal material, such as 
logistic supplies and uniforms, from China. 88 An estimated 4,000 Chinese are now 
residing in Timor where they control small and medium commerce.89 If one takes into 
account that Timor-Leste has a mere one million inhabitants, the Chinese community is 
quite significant. The Chinese are the second largest foreign group after the Indonesians. 
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So far, China’s charm offensive in Timor seems to be working, with the country’s 
top leadership expressing gratitude to the PRC and lending support to Beijing on several 
international issues, such as Tibet, Taiwan, and human rights.90  
Chinese small traders have been taking their cheap products to the most remote 
areas of the mountainous island where the poor people of these regions appreciate their 
presence. Growing numbers of Timorese are now going to China for studies; in 2008 
alone, an estimated 140 public servants went to China for training.91 The education of 
foreign elites has, in the past, brought America tremendous diplomatic and political 
benefits through the world. China may soon begin to benefit from such investments in 
soft power.  
In January 2011, a delegation from Chinese state-owned Eximbank visited Dili to 
negotiate the possible provision to Timor of a soft loan for infrastructure development. 
The loan, expected to be as high as $3 billion, would completely change the small 
country’s economy and make China the nation’s main economic partner. However, the 
deal has run into delays due to serious objections from the country’s British- and 
Australian-trained finance minister who has more than forty Australian advisors working 
for her. Despite this, China’s National Development Bank has recently signed an 
agreement with the Timorese government for economic cooperation. The details of this 
agreement are not yet known. 
China’s growing presence in Timor has led the United States to expand its 
presence in the country, increasing the amount of aid and strengthening its diplomatic 
presence. Washington is particularly concerned over the growing military cooperation 
between China and Timor. While not at the top of the U.S. priority list, Timor is set in a 
strategically important area between Australia and Indonesia, and in front of the vital 
Straits of Ombei and Wetar, one of the deepest underwater trenches in the world. This 
area is important for submarine passage linking the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, a vital 
“choke point” in any future conflict. Since last year, several Chinese officials and 
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academics have openly defended the establishment of overseas naval bases to protect the 
country’s growing maritime trade and its massive energy imports. China reluctantly 
accepts the security provided by the U.S. Navy in the global commons and eagerly waits 
for the day in which the People’s Liberation Army Navy could assume the role of 
defending Chinese interests on the high seas. This uneasiness on the part of China is 
clearly demonstrated in the growing number of incidents involving the Chinese military, 
the U.S., and Southeast Asia nations in the disputed South China Sea. 92  
In December 2011, several media reports claimed that the Chinese government, at 
the invitation of the government of Seychelles, was considering the establishment of a 
naval base in the Indian Ocean archipelago nation. According to the reports, the base is to 
assist in international anti-piracy efforts.93 
In 2001, WikiLeaks claimed that China approached the Timorese government to 
request the opening of an electronic eavesdropping base in the country’s south coast.94 
The south coast of Timor faces the Northern Territories of Australia, where 70 percent of 
its military concentrations are located. A Chinese eavesdropping facility in the south 
coast would also allow the Chinese military to eavesdrop on Pine Gap, the largest 
electronic spy base in the Asia Pacific, jointly run by the Australians and the CIA. In 
2011, the United States announced its intention to open a base in Darwin, Northern 
Territories, Australia, about 400 miles from Timor’s south coast.95 
The U.S. Navy has, in recent years, increased its presence in Timor and is at the 
front of American diplomatic efforts. Several American ships have visited the island 
since 2008, with the largest contingent in early 2010, when three America warships and 
1,500 marines conducted landing and rescue exercises for five days, displaying the 
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massive power of the United States. As of 2010, the United States has permanently 
deployed a platoon of Navy engineers, the Sea Bees, in Timor, where they engage in 
humanitarian assistance projects—building schools, repairing roads, and supporting local 
authorities. The Sea Bees are deployed to the most remote parts of the country, where 
they make a big difference. 
The U.S. Navy has been, for several years, regularly deploying to Timor the USS 
Mercy, the largest hospital ship in the world, and has treated thousands of Timorese 
patients. The work of the USS Mercy and the Sea Bees has won the United States much 
respect from the local community and has greatly enhanced American soft power. 
Several American NGOs have been assisting the people in very remote areas of the 
country, where they are generally welcomed. The election of President Obama in 2008 
was met with widespread celebration and dismissed the myth of America as a racist 
society. 
America’s growing engagement with Timor comes at a crucial time when 
Australia, Timor’s main security guarantor and political partner, has grown more 
unpopular among the Timorese as a result of racist attitudes on the part of some of its 
advisors and troops stationed in the country. China’s growing influence in Timor, and the 
relative decline of Australian prestige, is a trend seen throughout the region, where 
Australia is usually perceived as a neocolonial and racist country. Chinese presence is 
now well established in the South Pacific, where isolating Taiwan is no longer China’s 
only objective.  
Timor also has a very symbolic value for many Western nations who see the birth 
of the new nation as the affirmation of principles such as human rights and democracy. 
This explains the distortional attention given to Timor by certain Western nations and the 
international media. In the eyes of many liberals in the West, China’s growing presence 
in Timor-Leste is seen as an aberration, with some pointing to the negative impacts of 
some of the major business deals done with China in terms of transparency and 
accountability. It should be noted that some of the criticism is rather misplaced and 
simplistic, for the Chinese did not bring corruption to Timor. The Timorese are not the 
twenty-first century version of the noble savage being morally deformed by the Chinese.  
 44
America’s approach to building soft power in Timor does not rely so much on 
building impressive buildings, such as the Presidential Palace. It has been focused on 
reaching the grass roots through USAID and the Navy. However, using the navy to build 
soft power also sends a clear message that the United States is still the dominant player in 
Asia. American emphasis on humanitarian assistance and the quality of its diplomats, 
such as the widely respected Ambassador Hans Klem, has made America’s image and 
reputation prosper in Timor. 
In a time of economic difficulty, the United States could learn from its experience 
in Timor, where competent diplomats with very limited means have been able to obtain 
results far more satisfactory than allies and competitors alike with far more resources at 
their disposal. Humanitarian assistance, scholarships, and other grassroots diplomacy 
have earned the United States prestige in a country that was initially resentful of U.S. 
support of the Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999. 
China, on the other hand, has focused most of its efforts on state-to-state and 
institutional relations, neglecting the grassroots level. While many Timorese see the 
Chinese government in a positive light, the growing number of Chinese traders is slowly 
generating some resentment among the populace96.  
Despite these problems, however, China is seen as an important and valuable 
partner that has assisted Timor in areas no one was willing to do so. The Chinese 
presence is likely to continue to grow in Timor-Leste because, while Timor is not among 
Beijing’s priority list, China sees its presence in the territory—just like the United 
States—as a test to its overall global soft power and influence vis a vis the United States. 
In February 2011, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton warns of the dangers of 
reducing American external aid at a time when China was expanding its global influence. 
Mrs. Clinton will have to make that case to Congress, which is eager to cut government 
spending, something of no concern to her Chinese counterparts.97  
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G. WHEN GIANTS MEET: CHINA AND BRAZIL 
When President Lula Da Silva took office in 2002, establishing relations with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was defined as one of his main foreign policy 
priorities. In the past decade, relations between the quasi-super power and the South 
American giant have expanded beyond anyone’s expectations. In April 2009, China 
became Brazil’s largest trading partner after 85 years of American dominance, with trade 
between the two nations reaching $36 billion. Both countries have cooperated in very 
sensitive technology sectors, launching four jointly developed satellites. In 2009, Chinese 
navy pilots began training at the Brazilian aircraft carrier Sao Paulo in preparation for the 
deployment of China’s first aircraft carrier.98  
In 2010, the Chinese government granted Brazil a $10 billion loan to assist in the 
development of the newly discovered Tupi oil fields in southern Brazil. Chinese 
companies have won very lucrative contracts in Brazil in areas such as infrastructure, 
telecommunications, and the service sector, with Chinese FDI reaching $17 billion in 
2010.99 China has also invested over $2 billion in the steel industry.100 In August 2010, 
China’s steel giant Wuhan Steel & Steel pledged to invest another $5 billion in the 
country’s steel sector. In 2009, Brazilian agricultural exports to China reached $4.8 
billion making Brazil China’s main source of such imports. The economies of both 
countries seem to have a great degree of complementarities and offer both countries 
ample opportunity for mutual benefits. 
Both countries also grew increasingly close, politically supporting each other’s 
position in issues such as the world trade regime, human rights, UN reform, and climate 
change. In 2009, in the wake of the world economic crisis and a weakening American 
dollar, both countries signed a currency swap agreement under which both nations 
pledged to increasingly conduct their bilateral trade in their respective currencies. China 
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is quite keen on reducing the influence of the U.S. currency, and Brazil seems to share 
the same desire. Both countries have challenged the U.S. and its allies on issues such as 
Iran and nuclear proliferation, and have cooperated very closely on the transfers of 
nuclear technology. Meanwhile, Brazilian companies, such as mining giant Vale and 
aircraft manufacturer Embraer, have invested heavily in China. In 2004, an enthusiastic 
President Lula said, “China and Brazil don't have overwhelming muscle, but by 
cooperating they do improve their position.”101 
This growing economic and political interaction between the two giants led some 
observers to conclude that a growing political alliance was being forged between two 
raising powers to balance American global influence. While indeed Sino-Brazilian ties 
have witnessed a remarkable increase, closer scrutiny shows that things are far more 
complex. 
Sino-Brazilian relations benefited enormously from the personal enthusiasm of 
long-serving Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim and President Lula. Amorim 
confronted serious reservations and opposition from the Brazilian political establishment 
and the business sector, who feared the negative impacts of Brazilian recognition of 
China as a free market economy and the opening of Brazil’s market. The Brazilian 
business sector has been highly critical of the country’s trade policy towards China. 
Brazilian steel manufacturers complain that Brazil has been naïve at opening its markets 
to China because, so far, China has failed to reciprocate. Since 2005, Brazil has lodged 
140 anti-dumping complaints against China at the WTO.  
Brazilian textile manufacturers have been hard hit by cheap Chinese imports and 
the once-thriving sector is struggling to survive. Joze Gomes da Silva, president of the 
Brazilian Textile Association, complains, “The openness of the Brazilian economy can't 
just lie on opening imports to every country while not getting anything in return.”102 
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Many in Brazil resent the “neocolonial” nature of the relationship; there seems to 
be an asymmetric dimension to Sino-Brazilian ties witnessed in the nature of bilateral 
trade. While Brazil exports to China some high-end manufactures, such as aeronautics 
and gas turbines, most of the country’s exports to the PRC consisted of primary goods 
and energy resources. Agriculture products account for 70 percent of Brazilian exports, 
with timber and minerals accounting for over 20 percent. Conversely, China exports to 
Brazil low to mid-end manufactured goods, such as TVs, phones, textiles, and 
machinery.103 
The opportunities offered by the large Chinese market to Brazilian companies 
were expected to offset and compensate for losses caused by Chinese penetration of the 
Brazilian economy. The critics argue, however, that excessive Chinese protectionism has 
made it very difficult for Brazil’s companies to operate in China. For instance, the much-
acclaimed joint Venture between Brazil’s aeronautic company Embraer and China’s 
Harbin Aviation Industry for the production of a middle-sized jetliner is now marred in 
controversy. The joint venture was to benefit both sides by allowing China to obtain the 
technology no Western nation is willing to share, while Brazil would benefit from a 
promised order of 1,000 planes. Embraer officials complained that, by 2009, China has 
made far fewer orders than originally promised and was instead producing its own plane 
using Brazilian technology.104 
The Brazilians also accuses the Chinese of luring them with the promise of big 
sales to the growing Chinese domestic aviation market simply to get their technology, 
only to be left them in the cold. In 2008, Embraer sales were so low that the company 
seriously considered terminating its operation in China after just four years. Tensions 
were aggravated when, in April 2010, an Embraer jet crashed in China, killing 42 people. 
The Chinese authorities accused the successful Brazilian manufacturer of low quality 
controls. An irate Embraer official pointed out that its planes are being used in far larger 
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numbers in Europe, the United States, and Australia, and so far have had no problems. 
The Brazilian’s intern pointed to China’s dismal maintenance and safety record.105 After 
a joint investigation carried out by the both sides, the Chinese had to admit embarrassedly 
that pilot error was the cause of the accident and not the alleged poor quality of 
Embraer’s technology.106 
Brazil is also growing increasingly uneasy over China’s growing penetration into 
Brazil’s traditional markets in South America. In 1995, Brazil exported $5.7 billion in 
industrial goods to the region, while China exported $1.4 billion. In 2004, China had 
exported $7.8 billion, while Brazil’s exports were $6.5 billion. The fact that cheaper 
Chinese imports are quickly replacing Brazilian products in neighboring countries further 
exacerbates concerns from Brazilian business interests. For instance, in 2003, 88 percent 
of Argentina’s television sets imports were from Brazil, while China accounted for a 
mere 1 percent. In 2009, Brazilian televisions accounted for 37 percent, while Chinese 
imports reached 42 percent. In recent years, the trade deficit between the two countries 
has been on the rise. In 2010, Brazilian exports to China fell to 3 percent, while Chinese 
exports to Brazil grew 89 percent. 107 
Sino-Brazilian competition is now spreading rapidly to former Portuguese Africa, 
where Brazilian companies are now faced with a surge in Chinese investments. Brazilian 
mining giant Vale is aggressively competing with the Chinese in coal-rich Mozambique. 
Since 2009, Vale has invested $1.3 billion in coalmines in the central provinces of 
Zambezia and Tete, while Chinese steel giant Wuhan Steel & Steel has invested 
$1 billion. Brazil has been investing heavily in oil-rich Angola where China is now the 
largest trading partner of that nation. In 2008, the director of the Brazilian state 
investment agency denied reports of Brazilian and Chinese competition over resources in 
Africa. During President’s Lula da Silva visit to Africa in July 2010, the Brazilian 
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newspaper Globo ran a story entitled “President Lula Exacerbates Brazilian Chinese 
Competition for African Market,” in which it described the growing tensions between the 
two giants.108 
In early 2011, Brazilian media reported that the government was planning to 
introduce protective legislation to safeguard the steel and mining sector in the country.109 
Among the legislation are laws establishing limits for foreign investment in certain 
sectors of the economy and laws establishing quotas forcing foreign companies to meet 
domestic market needs. The media reports clearly state that these measures were directed 
mainly at China. In November 2010, in a long interview with the Brazilian newspaper 
Estadao, Celso Amorim, the main architect of the Sino-Brazilian partnership, said that 
Brazil needed to rethink its relationship with China.110 After carefully nurturing this 
important relation, one of Brazil’s longest-serving foreign ministers and one of its most 
brilliant thinkers seemed to be consumed with doubts and regrets.  
Despite all the tensions, both countries enjoy ongoing benefits from this 
relationship. For instance, Chinese agriculture imports are crucial for Brazil’s economy in 
light of protectionist policies in the U.S. and Europe. Brazil needs Chinese capital to 
develop its new oil fields and is likely to side with China in many international issues, 
such as climate change and international negotiations trade. 
However, one thing seems to be certain; the enthusiasm for an alliance between 
two developing world giants—to counter the United States—seems to be dead. Sino-
Brazilian relations are likely to be marked by pure pragmatism, for the idealism of the 
Lula administration seems to have been badly misplaced. When President Obama visited 
Brazil in March, he was warmly received, with the tone of the visit being quite 
conciliatory and diplomatic. 
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Brazil thought of using China to balance the United States; however, it may now 
need the United Sates to balance China. In October 2010, in perhaps an indication of the 
current state of relations, a friendly basketball game between the Chinese and Brazilian 
national teams ended in a massive brawl. As the Brazilian saying goes, “Amigos amigos 
amigos, negocios a parte (There is no such a thing as friendship in business).” 
The Chinese seem to understand this better than the Brazilians do. 
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III. ASSESSING CHINA’S DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC 
STRATEGY 
As demonstrated in this work, the People’s Republic of China has increased its 
presence through the Lusophone world in the past decade. While China has obtained 
substantial economic gains, the level of its success varies from country to country. In 
Angola, China has gained an impressive economic presence with Angola being, in certain 
years, the major oil supplier to China. From 2007 to 2010, however, Angola has been 
China’s largest trading partner in Africa. Since 2002, Chinese state-owned banks have 
given Angola an estimated $15 billion in soft loans. 
It is very hard to argue that China’s economic strategy in Angola was not 
successful. The numbers speak for themselves. However, China’s soft power in Angola 
and its diplomatic influence is far less impressive. Angolans deeply resent the large 
numbers of Chinese workers in their country who, by some estimates, could be as many 
as 100,000. Poor Chinese workers tend to stay in Angola after finishing their work with 
their original Chinese employee and look for other opportunities. Many start as street 
vendors and other small business. Some even resort to crime. 
Poor Chinese migrants compete directly with the most poor and vulnerable 
Angolans, thus creating tensions. While China has been able to establish close ties to the 
Angolan leadership, the common Angolan remains very suspicious. Even among the 
elites, growing concerns over estar nas maos dos Chineses (to be in the hands of the 
Chinese) is promoting Angolan leaders to balance China’s presence. 
In Mozambique, China has also made some substantial economic gains. However, 
its diplomatic and political influence is not as significant. In Mozambique, the level of 
hostility from the grassroots is not as pronounced as it is in Angola. Unlike in Angola, 
Chinese companies began to hire more local people after an initial period of hiring very 
few local workers. Also in Mozambique, the number of Chinese migrants is much 
smaller and tends to be in activities that do not compete directly with the local Africans. 
Mozambique has a large South Asian minority, commonly addressed by the locals by the 
derogatory term monhe. Many locals find the Chinese traders to be less greedy and rude 
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than the monhe and, unlike in Angola, Chinese migrant workers are rarely involved in 
crime. In Mozambique, people of Pakistani descent have long been rumored to dominate 
the drug trade. 
Despite some impressive gains, China faces strong competition in Mozambique 
from its traditional partners, such as South Africa and Portugal, the former colonial 
power. New emerging powers, such as Brazil and India, have increased their presence in 
Mozambique, while the United States is slowly getting more involved. 
Unlike in Angola, China is not perceived as too dominant, and therefore the 
Mozambican elite see China as a welcomed force to balance its traditional allies. 
International relations theory and the realist school of thinking argue that states tend to 
balance against the strongest power. While China is fast becoming a major player in 
Mozambique, its presence is not yet seen as a threat. On the contrary, Mozambique has 
been encouraging more Chinese investment. 
In Guinea Bissau, China has ensured that Taiwan is unlikely to regain its lost 
friend and they have built a respectable presence in a poor unstable country where the 
United States closed its embassy more than twenty years ago. At a very low cost, China 
has gained the sympathy of many locals and the government. China’s rice diplomacy, 
infrastructure rehabilitation, and budget support have endeared China to a nation with 
very few alternatives. 
Due to chronic instability, very few Chinese live or have businesses in Guinea 
Bissau. The few Chinese who operate in the country are generally welcomed. 
Cape Verde is an unlikely place to find a large Chinese diaspora. An estimated 
5,000 Chinese may be living in the tiny nation, where they control most of the trade. 
Unlike in Angola, this immigration is largely welcomed by the natives who see the 
Chinese as providing affordable goods and generating jobs. Also, unlike in Angola, 
Chinese state-owned companies have very little interest in a dry and remote  
archipelago. Private Chinese citizens are the main economic players. However, as a result 
of the growing presence of private Chinese citizens, the Chinese government is now 
getting more involved. 
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In Timor-Leste, China has built close ties to the local elites and has been 
expanding its influence. China’s growing presence in Timor is part of its general 
expansion into the Southeast Asian area, which it sees as increasingly under its sphere. 
China has kept a quiet profile in Timor, so as not to alarm Australia and the 
United States. In the short to medium term, China’s main interest in Timor is to retain a 
reasonable political and diplomatic presence, keep Taiwan out, secure a diplomatic ally, 
and look for economic opportunities. In the long run, as the Chinese navy expands its 
reach, the territory is likely to grow in importance for Beijing. 
While the Chinese community has grown in Timor, relations with the locals are 
not particularly tense. However, if more and more Chinese—attracted by the oil 
economy—move to Timor, then tensions may arise. A few acts of violence against the 
Chinese have taken place, but they remain small in number and were not necessarily 
directed specifically at the Chinese. While China has succeeded in gaining a respectable 
presence in Timor, Australia, Portugal, and the United States remain the country’s most 
important security and economic partners. 
The way economic ties between China and Brazil have developed is breathtaking, 
with trade rising to unprecedented levels. While cooperation in sensitive areas, such as 
satellites and defense technologies, have brought the two nations closer together, the 
much-expected alliance of third-world giants to balance Western hegemony seems to be 
far from materializing, despite the fact that President Lula, his successor Dilma Rousseff, 
and some of the most left-wing leaders in Brazil have strongly encouraged it. It is 
unlikely that a right-wing government will be as enthusiastic. 
China’s relations with Brazil have brought both countries tremendous benefits. 
However, trade tensions are a regular feature in the relations. Politically and 
diplomatically, both countries have shared some objectives, such as their position on 
global warming and Iran. However, they are far from becoming a third-world alliance. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
China’s relations with the Lusophone world demonstrate the complexity and 
varied nature of China’s growing presence in the developing world. In the eyes of many, 
China is still seen, in places like Africa, as being predatory and desperate to extract 
resources. Beijing is often said to cozy-up to despotic regimes—such as Sudan, 
Zimbabwe, and Equatorial Guinea—in order to secure energy resources. 
As our analysis demonstrates, these perceptions are partly true and context driven. 
In Angola, China seems to be clearly motivated by its desire for natural resources, 
courting the long-serving regime and creating very few jobs for locals. 
However, in Cape Verde, a democratic and resource-poor country, Chinese 
businesses have done extremely well. The case of Cape Verde shows that Chinese 
business people can operate in legitimate environments, as well as corrupt ones. Many 
tend to blame China for the increase in corruption in Africa and elsewhere. It seems clear 
that large numbers of Chinese did not make Cape Verde corrupt. Chinese business is 
capable of adapting to numerous circumstances and displays a sophistication that is not 
often understood. 
In Mozambique, China was initially perceived as being greedy and devastating 
the environment and resentment existed over the lack of job creation. However, a 
combination of rising labor costs in China and attempts at dealing with local resentment 
has seen Chinese businesses create more and more jobs for the locals. 
Lusophone Africa demonstrates that Chinese investment goes well beyond 
resources extraction to include industry, tourism, agriculture, and banking. Lusophone 
challenges many of our previous assumptions about China in Africa. What these cases 
teach us is that Africa is very diverse and so is the nature of Chinese business. 
It is also evident from these cases that China has a long-term approach to its 
relations with the Lusophone world, and that its diplomats and business people are very 
patient and persistent. The image of the Chinese businessman as a corrupt and crookedly 
dealing with despotic regimes is far too simplistic. In countries where corruption is high, 
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the Chinese will make use of less legitimate methods to obtain contracts and other 
privileges. In Cape Verde, there is hardly any complaint about China corrupting local 
officials. Whether China corrupts the developing world is up to the leaders and peoples of 
these nations more than it is up to the Chinese. 
A story seldom told is that literally thousands of small to medium Chinese 
entrepreneurs tried their luck in the remote mountains of Timor, the deserts of Chad, and 
in the immensity of the Amazon. They went to places the West has forgotten. Many made 
a fortune, others did just okay. Some even lost their lives. Today, after many sacrifices, 
private Chinese entrepreneurs have established an impressive presence in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. Just like the American pioneers in the early and mid-nineteenth 
century, they took risks. Some lived to be rich, while others fell prey to hostile arrows. 
Perhaps by looking into its own history, America may better understand China. 
In Timor-Leste, China has focused its attention on diplomatic and political issues, 
while also keeping an eye for profit. Chinese diplomats are sophisticated enough to 
understand that Australia and the U.S. see their presence in Timor with concerns, and 
have kept a low profile. Fluent in Portuguese, their diplomats have forged close ties with 
local elites. 
Despite ongoing tensions, Sino-Brazilian ties are likely to continue to expand. 
However, the relationship will be one based on pragmatism, with the so-called South-
South alliance unlikely to go beyond rhetoric. Today, Brazil is one of China’s most 
important relations. 
The Lusophone countries have grown in importance for China in areas such as 
energy security and markets. Some, like Angola and Brazil, have become vital for 
Beijing’s prosperity. As such, the People’s Republic of China will continue to invest in 
the relationship in a proactive and determined way. The case of the Lusophone world 
attests to the growing sophistication of Chinese foreign and economic policies, and defies 
simple explanations of China’s presence in the developing world. 
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It is also evident from these cases that China has a long-term approach to its 
relations with the Lusophone world, and that its diplomats and businesspeople are very 
patient and persistent. 
This work has focused on state actors or great companies. I would like to finish 
this eight-year long research with a few lines on the people. One was Hu Xi, a poor 
Chinese farmer, an old man from Hubei Province of China. He once took the risk to 
move to Timor at a time when the UN and the Peace Corp was evacuated due to the 
serious internal instability. After six years, Mr. Hu Xi runs a successful grocery business 
throughout the country, delivering affordable products to the most remote areas, often 
forgotten by the government. There are literally thousands of stories like this throughout 
Africa and Latin America. In the end, we are all so similar. We just want a better life.  
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